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Abstract—This theoretical paper attempts to define some of 
the key components and challenges required to create 
embodied conversational agents that can be genuinely 
interesting conversational partners. Wittgenstein’s argument 
concerning talking lions emphasizes the importance of having 
a shared common ground as a basis for conversational 
interactions. Virtual bats suggests that–for some people at 
least–it is important that there be a feeling of authenticity 
concerning a subjectively experiencing entity that can convey 
what it is like to be that entity. Electric sheep reminds us of the 
importance of empathy in human conversational interaction 
and that we should provide a full communicative repertoire of 
both verbal and non-verbal components if we are to create 
genuinely engaging interactions. Also we may be making the 
task more difficult rather than easy if we leave out non-verbal 
aspects of communication. Finally, analogical peacocks 
highlights the importance of between minds alignment and 
establishes a longer term goal of being interesting, creative, 
and humorous if an embodied conversational is to be truly an 
engaging conversational partner. Some potential directions 
and solutions to addressing these issues are suggested.  
Keywords—engagement; common ground; subjective 
experience; empathy; mind-reading display. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Turing’s [1] idea of the imitation game–now more 
commonly referred to as the Turing test–sought to provide a 
test of what would become known as artificial intelligence–
specifically artificial intelligence that mimics human 
behavior. The test argued that, within the remit of the game, 
if someone could not tell the difference between a human 
and a machine interlocutor then we have a reasonable start 
for assuming that the machine possesses an intelligence of 
some sort. Another way to think about this would be that the 
machine could create a conversational interaction with a 
human that was engaging in the same way that a human-
human conversation could be engaging. It also sought to 
level the playing field between human and machine by 
ensuring a reasonably fair comparison given the constraints 
of technology in the time of Turing and what he could 
imagine was coming. The leveling was to be achieved by 
ensuring that any interaction was carried out by using a 
linguistic question and answer session, one that meant that 
the interlocutors could not see each other–in modern versions 
of the test this typically uses an instant messaging like 
scenario. Turing reasoned that this stopped the game from 
becoming a beauty competition in which a human would win 
or a competition that favoured the machine in some way, 
which he likened to a race between a man and an aeroplane. 
In constraining the test to a non-visual question and answer 
session he gave a primacy to the linguistic components of 
human communication and probably unwittingly removed 
many important non-verbal channels of communication from 
the classic Turing test; the thought of having computational 
machines capable of producing human facial expressions 
amongst other affective cues was at that time a distant dream 
that perhaps only Turing and a few others could envisage.  
The current state of affective computing is such that 
machines are probably now at a disadvantage by not 
providing the relevant affective cues; these are the cues that 
tend to regulate communicative behavior and encourage 
polite behavior in human-human interactions. It is easier to 
engage in aggressive questioning and interrogation if you are 
not aware that you may be hurting your interlocutor’s 
feelings–in both human-human and human-machine 
interactions [2], [3]. This paper will argue that for effective 
engagement between humans and machines to become a 
reality there must be: an effective common ground and 
shared common interest between interlocutors; that a pre-
requisite for engaging conversation, at least for some, is that 
there must be a convincing conversational partner that can 
convey what it is like to be that conversational partner; both 
verbal and non-verbal aspects of human communication 
must be convincing; and the common ground and common 
interest must be aligned in ways that create mutual 
understanding with knowledge of the conversational 
expectations of the other interlocutor. If conversation is to 
excel then the ability to violate these conversational 
expectations in subtle and interesting ways is also required.  
II. ARTIFICIAL LISTENERS 
The SEMAINE project was a large European Framework 
7 Project that sought to build autonomous artificial listeners–
these are embodied conversational agents with an emphasis 
on listening rather than engaging in full conversation. The 
project achieved some degree of success in these goals [4], 
[5]. Towards the end of the project there was an evaluation 
phase that involved testing the quality of interactions with 
the Sensitive Artificial Listeners that had been created as part 
of the project. The SEMAINE system built four embodied 
conversational agents based around four characters with 
different personalities [6]. Participants interacted with each 
of these personalities in turn and had to evaluate the nature 
of the interaction. About 80 evaluation sessions were 
conducted in total and a final evaluation experiment 
involving 30 participants interacting with two versions of the 
system and the four characters was published [4]. The two 
versions of the system involved differing levels of emotional 
and affective signals and the final experiment showed that 
for some of the characters an increase in the affective signals 
led to improvements in levels of behavioural and felt 
engagement (an example interaction can be observed here 
[7]). This was an extensive exercise in the evaluation of 
embodied conversational agents and many lessons were 
learned but as is often the way these lessons were not always 
reported or published. One example of an unreported but 
obvious characteristic of the interaction was that there were 
strong individual differences in the way people interacted 
with the system. The author of this paper conducted these 
evaluations and watched each of the sessions as they 
occurred; individual differences were obvious and some 
people found it easy to interact with a virtual character while 
others remained completely silent. However, despite having 
given the participants an extensive set of psychometric tests 
to assess which personality factors may be affecting their 
interactions and levels of engagement no systematic link 
with any standard or relevant personality variables were 
found. As there was no systematic link a simple vehicle for 
reporting these differences was not available. 
The nature of the SEMAINE system employed a 
conversational trick. The instructions told the participants to 
lead the conversations and the agents were only listeners 
who would prompt with questions and provide appropriate 
feedback but they would not drive the conversations. This 
enabled some participants who were perhaps more skilled 
conversationalists and unperturbed by talking to a computer 
to engage in conversation for up to three minutes before an 
inevitable poor selection of utterance by the SEMAINE 
system led to conversational breakdown. As a result of this 
there was an element of luck in the system, if the utterance 
sequence was such that the participant could repair the 
conversation and was inclined to do so then conversation 
could continue. If the utterance was too bizarre early in the 
conversation then rapport never really got established and the 
interaction broke down in the early stages. Despite a 
relatively large number of participants these more or less 
random issues probably add sufficient noise to the data to 
mask any systematic personality variable effects that may 
have been influencing the interactions. 
The sections that follow will introduce some 
philosophical arguments that provide a basis for theoretical 
considerations when assessing aspects of engagement 
between humans and machines. They borrow insights from a 
number of philosophical arguments relevant to human-
human and human-machine interactions that happen to have 
used animals as examples, often as metaphorical substitutes 
for machines, and hence I have used the label Turing’s 
menagerie.  
III. TALKING LIONS AND VIRTUAL BATS 
A. Talking Lions 
In Wittgenstein’s famous “later work” Philosophical 
Investigations [8] he makes the enigmatic comment “If a lion 
could talk, we could not understand him.” The usual 
interpretation of this remark is that there is no common 
ground between the mental states of a lion and the mental 
states of a human, that is, there is no shared frame of 
reference between a lion and a human upon which to build a 
communicative understanding. As humans we have no idea 
what it is like to be a lion and following Wittgenstein we 
assume that lions have no understanding of what it is like to 
be a human and no motivation towards understanding what it 
would be like to be a human. The world’s of lions and 
humans are so different that even if the procedural barriers to 
a communicative interaction were removed there would be 
little if anything to actually converse about. Earlier in the 
work Wittgenstein suggests that “the common behaviour of 
mankind is the system of reference by means of which we 
interpret an unknown language,” meaning that we require 
some common understanding to act as a starting place for 
our interpretations of another’s communicative meaning or 
intent. It is the commonality of our shared experience with 
one another that forms the basis of our communicative 
interactions and therefore to build an engaging 
communicative system we must be aware of the need for 
common ground upon which engagement can grow. This is 
often implicitly assumed but it is worth explicitly 
acknowledging the importance of this as, although they are 
distant from us in terms of mental state, lions have somewhat 
more common ground with humans than most computational 
machines have with humans. 
There are a number of implications of this thought for the 
affective computing community. A slightly trivial comment 
is that we may share some aspects of affective 
communication with a lion while still lacking the ability to 
verbally interact; a lion’s roar is still very likely to 
communicate an intention that will motivate most humans 
with a will to survive into a fast course of action. This 
reminds us that Wittgenstein was largely embedded in a 
language based understanding of communication rather than 
communication in a broader sense; a broader sense that 
would incorporate signaling that Darwin [9] would have 
placed within the human communicative realm. However, 
the main point Wittgenstein is making is still a very 
important one for affective computing, because if there is 
little common ground between a lion and a human there is 
none between the inanimate circuitry of a computer and a 
human–neither verbal or non-verbal. This presents a major 
problem for developing engagement between computers and 
humans all of the processes for signaling that develop 
engagement–verbal, non-verbal, and procedural–must be 
provided by the system developer.  
B. Virtual Bats 
Within the SEMAINE evaluation phase, one of the 
important aspects that seemed to be driving engagement was 
the degree to which the participants could suspend their 
disbelief and place some value in their conversational 
partner–the embodied conversational agent. This is both 
interesting from the aspect of those who could and those who 
could not suspend disbelief. For those that could, they 
seemed to enter into a game-playing mode in which they 
would keep a conversation alive assuming that the reacting 
partner–the agent–had value as a conversational entity. For 
those that could not suspend disbelief they saw little value in 
engaging in a conversation with what amounted in their view 
to a plastic box filled with circuitry, there was no actual thing 
present that was worthy of being a conversational partner.  
This raises the issue that when people interact with one 
another in human-human conversation the point of having a 
conversation is assumed and taken for granted. The person 
with whom they are interacting might be a nice person with 
whom they may build a friendship, they may be useful as a 
contact for the future or they may be a potential romantic 
partner; it may also simply be the right thing to do to interact 
with another human being in a polite and socially acceptable 
manner, as that is how you would like most people who do 
not know you to interact with you in future circumstances. In 
human-human interactions there is almost always a point to 
behaving in the appropriate way for the social context–to 
seem polite and avoid giving offense. The fundamental 
motivation driving this set of assumptions is that during a 
conversation you are talking to a conscious human being 
with thoughts and feelings, a conversational partner, 
something that is so obvious and taken for granted that we 
barely notice it. None of these issues can be taken for granted 
in the developing engagement with a conversational agent. 
 In another famous philosophical work of the twentieth 
century Thomas Nagel–this time addressing the issue of 
what it is like to be conscious–asked “What is it like to be a 
bat?” [10]. The “bat” argument is concerned with the special 
nature of being conscious, and Nagel argued that there is 
something special about consciousness that means we cannot 
really deal with it in a reductionist way. It is not like other 
problems in science where reductionism can make 
substantial inroads to the problem because in the case of 
consciousness we have a core issue of subjective experience. 
He used the example of being a bat and started with the 
assumption that we all believe that as a bat is a mammal it 
has some sort of experience as it goes about its existence. 
Bats are useful in this thought experiment as they are close to 
humans in a phylogenetic space but very different in sensory 
and perceptual apparatus so presumably their experience is 
very different too. The argument suggests that we must 
extrapolate from our own experiences to imagine what it is 
like to be a bat, however, we are fundamentally limited and 
cannot hope to actually use our imaginations to know what it 
is to subjectively be a bat and experience existence in the 
way a bat experiences its existence. The argument is anti-
reductionist, claiming that we cannot learn from tearing 
down to component parts and building up again as the 
crucial aspect of subject experience is something that is an 
intrinsic part of the whole functioning system and not 
something that we will gain special insight into by knowing 
each of the component parts in more details. There is 
something in the nature of subjective experience, in being an 
entity, that is special to the particular nature of the whole 
system. This is related to Searle’s Chinese Room thought 
experiment [11], which argues against the idea that we can 
simply build a machine that functions in the same way as a 
living entity and expect it to be conscious and have a 
subjective experience.  
I will not go further into the details of Nagel’s argument. 
However, I wish to suggest the hypothesis that one of the 
important dimensions experienced in generating engagement 
with embodied conversational agents was the degree to 
which participants had an intrinsic leaning towards a 
Nagelian worldview. In the sense in which for some people 
there is a belief that there can never be a virtual agent that 
has something of a subjective experience that is the same as 
the subjective experience of what it is like to be a human. 
Participants with a strong Nagelian worldview will always 
feel as if they are engaging with a box and circuitry and 
while it might be an interesting oddity to have computer 
graphics that are in the form of a human there is little point 
in engaging in a meaningful interaction with these artificial 
humans as there is no essence there that can experience the 
conversational interaction. For this subset of people disbelief 
cannot be suspended. This is to be contrasted with the other 
end of the dimension which we may label the Turing end for 
whom imitation is good enough–if it looks like a bat and acts 
like a bat then it probably is a bat. For this subset of the 
population disbelief is easier to suspend and given the right 
set of stimuli engaging interaction with an artificial agent is 
just a matter of being presented with the correct set of non-
verbal stimuli and a sufficiently convincing, an appropriate 
set of sequential utterances and subsequently the belief that 
the agent possesses a subjective experience and some sort of 
theory of mind becomes relatively easy. In these 
circumstances within the SEMAINE evaluation there were 
some participants who went so far as to create fantastical 
backstories for their agents, the agents would be imagined to 
go back into the box for the weekend and party with the 
other characters waiting for their next interactions the 
following week. This Nagelian to Turing dimension seemed 
to be an important discriminator along which the participants 
were placed although none of the psychometric tests that we 
gave to the participants were able to assess it. 
If we extend Wittgenstein’s reasoning to our bats it is 
extremely unlikely that if we were to talk to a bat we would 
have anything in common with them to talk about. However, 
if it were possible to find something to talk about our human 
curiosity is more likely to steer us towards seeking 
conversation with an actual bat, seeking information about 
what it is like to be a bat, rather than towards a virtual bat, 
seeking information about what it is like to be some circuitry 
and programming that is pretending to be a bat. Here one 
would imagine there is something important in actually 
being a bat that is more alluring as a conversational topic, 
and consequentially as a conversational partner, than in the 
pretending to be a bat without any history or experience or 
illuminating comment about past bat-style adventures other 
than those programmed by other humans who also have no 
experience about what it is like to be a bat. I highlight this 
somewhat ludicrous scenario to illustrate the need for 
authenticity in the backstory of a conversational partner to 
make the conversational partner truly interesting to talk to. If 
the conversational partner has no interesting tales of seeing 
flying fish skim across the water on far off oceans–and I 
suspect very few embodied conversational agents do–then 
interestingness must come from sources other than the agent 
themselves, they must become interesting for reasons other 
than their personal autobiography. It would be illuminating 
to attempt to converse with a bat but somewhat less fulfilling 
to converse with a virtual bat. 
IV. EMPATHY AND ELECTRIC SHEEP 
A particularly important aspect of engagement with 
regard to affective computing is evident in the next animal in 
Turing’s menagerie, electric sheep. Philip K. Dick explores 
the issues of fake and real sentient entities in his science 
fiction novel “Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep,” [12] 
the book is set in a post nuclear war world where most 
humans have left the planet and receive a humanoid android 
when they leave Earth to become colonists. Certain humans–
those with radiation induced genetic abnormalities–are not 
allowed to leave Earth. As technology develops the androids 
become more human like but are not allowed back to Earth 
as they are required to be slave-like workers for the 
colonists. When they do escape and go to earth it is the job of 
the hero of the book “Rick Deckard” to track them down and 
present them with an empathy test, as the ability to 
empathize is the key distinguishing feature between androids 
and humans. One of the key tensions in the book arises due 
to the android technology catching up with both human and 
psychometric abilities to detect the differences in the ability 
to empathize. The best of the androids become difficult to 
distinguish from the lower ends of the human scale 
presenting a moral dilemma, as it is acceptable to kill 
androids but not humans. The electric sheep are part of the 
story as it has become a moral duty and a point of social 
status to keep animals as pets to keep their genetic stock 
alive, but as real animals are expensive many people are 
forced to use cheaper artificial animals in their stead to retain 
an element of social status. The book explores what it means 
to be fake and real in terms of building artificial animate 
entities. The exploration raises a number of important issues 
for the current argument. 
For the affective computing community one of the 
important issues is that it is the ability to empathize and 
show emotions correctly that distinguishes humans from 
androids. This contrasts with the view more typical in the 
preceding decades in which Turing was formulating his test 
that suggested that the most important and distinguishing 
aspect of humanity was its rationality and intelligence. 
Turing was creating the ideas for his imitation game in an era 
that had been dominated by logical-positivism, the Vienna 
circle and Frege, Russell and the young Wittgenstein’s 
attempts to make explicit the foundations of mathematics 
and logic. As a result it was probably easy for Turing in his 
imitation game to exclude the visual and paralinguistic 
components of human communication–partly for pragmatic 
reasons and partly as they could be viewed as part of the 
beauty contest that a computer could not win. For Dick 
however, empathy was the distinguishing feature of 
humanity: “empathy, evidently, existed only within the 
human community, whereas intelligence to some degree 
could be found throughout every phylum and order including 
the arachnida.” The equivalent of the Turing test in Dick’s 
book comes in a variety of versions of the “Voigt-Kampff 
scale” where various emotionally compromising situations 
are recounted to the human or android and the correct–socio-
normative–physiological and emotional responses to the 
socially awkward situation are closely observed for cues to 
genuine feelings within the participant. Clearly Turing places 
a primacy on the linguistic aspects of human communication 
and Dick places a primacy on empathy and the non-verbal 
components of human communication, those that are the 
primary concern of affective computing and social signal 
processing research domains. One of the ultimate questions 
of the book is whether we can feel “empathy toward an 
artificial construct,” toward “something that only pretends to 
be alive?” Could we make a connection with and engage as 
easily with an electric sheep as a real sheep.  
Turing [1] did address these issues quoting Jefferson 
(1949 cited in [1]) “Not until a machine can write a sonnet or 
compose a concerto because of thoughts and emotions felt, 
and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we agree that 
machine equals brain.” Turing also raises a similar point to 
Nagel and pre-empts Nagel’s argument “the only way by 
which one could be sure that a machine thinks is to be the 
machine and to feel oneself thinking.” A point he rejects as 
too close to solipsistic thinking. 
Two important points arise from the realization of the 
importance of the affective components of human 
communication in human machine interaction. Far from 
leveling the playing field the removal of affective 
communication makes the task of the machine more difficult. 
One important aspect is that it removes crucial information 
concerning the “feelings” of a machine; observation of 
signals associated with feelings have the important 
consequence of enforcing the socio-normative behaviours of 
politeness, and minimizing aggressive questioning that may 
“upset” the machine [2], [3]. A second point is that much of 
what convinces us of the interlocutor’s genuine nature comes 
from these affective cues; they provide signs that there is a 
“genuine feeler” that is being conversed with and is arguably 
more important than convincing the interlocutor that there is 
a “genuine knower” that is a common goal of more 
traditional Turing tests. To be a convincing conversational 
human one must both show signs of knowing and delivering 
from a typical body of human knowledge and being able to 
feel what it is like to be a human. 
A final point more clearly focuses on the question of 
engagement and that is the realization that for some people to 
become motivated to engage in a conversation with an 
embodied conversational agent they must be convinced that 
there is some genuine felt existence occurring otherwise any 
conversation that is not purely based on retrieving 
information will be without purpose. 
V. ANALOGICAL PEACOCKS 
This question of the purpose of human communication 
brings us to an important fourth animal–the analogical 
peacock. McKeown [13] has argued that we need to reassess 
our assumptions concerning the purpose of human 
communication. Traditionally there has been an assumption 
that human communication has been largely instrumental in 
nature, it exists mostly to pass information to one another for 
the purposes of problem solving and cooperation–in this 
view we talk to each other to provide information and be 
informative about our mental and felt states. This 
instrumental provision of information argument has been 
questioned by some who favour more socio-communicative 
explanations, the act of communicating itself may serve to 
foster bonds and the actual information itself is less 
important than the act of engaging in communication [14], 
[15]. McKeown [13] argues for a different but related 
explanation, that we principally communicate to display our 
mind-reading skills. Mind-reading skills show us to be 
socially and politically astute animals likely to achieve social 
status and to rise through the social hierarchy and as a 
consequence get access to better resources and mating 
opportunities. Therefore it becomes useful to demonstrate 
our mind-reading skills to make ourselves more attractive as 
potential mates and allies. We display our mind reading 
skills by being creative, humorous and verbally fluent as well 
as empathetic and cooperative–showing that we know 
people’s expectations and desires. The peacock part of the 
hypothesis refers to this display element and the use of 
creativity and humour adds the analogies to create the 
analogical peacock hypothesis. In addition to display 
communications there is a second important aspect to human 
communication in this hypothesis. To become good mind-
readers we must spend a large proportion of our existence 
learning about the minds of other people. We need to align 
our minds with those of others in our social groups so that 
we are aware of the contents of their minds when the 
opportunities for display arise. This makes us intellectually 
curious about the knowledge in other people’s minds and the 
things that might interest them; it also makes us emotionally 
curious about the feelings of others and the things that might 
move them. 
A further prediction of the analogical peacock hypothesis 
is that we can display our mind-reading ability not only by 
being creative, humorous, and empathetic; we can also 
display our mind-reading ability by showing our awareness 
of the most interesting and relevant information within the 
minds of our social group cluster at a given moment in time. 
This awareness of what is currently fashionable, trending and 
relevant is known as “taste as display” and is a method of 
elevating social status. If someone is deemed to have good 
awareness of the current trends they are likely to be a more 
engaging and sought after conversational partner. 
These factors of intellectual and emotional curiosity are 
the key components of engagement in communication. 
According to McKeown [13] our need to align our minds to 
the minds of others in our social group will motivate our 
conversational engagement in situations where we are likely 
to learn about what interests others and what “moves” other 
emotionally. With regard to embodied conversational agents 
this presents a problem, if we are not convinced that there is 
an existing being with genuine interests or genuine ability to 
feel and be moved, and with sufficient common interests, 
then the agent cannot satisfy either our intellectual curiosity 
or emotional curiosity. Additionally, if there is no likelihood 
of becoming friends or a potential mate with a conversational 
agent, then the social goals that motivate engaging and 
protracted conversational interactions are unlikely to be met. 
VI. SOLUTIONS AND DIRECTIONS 
In the short term there are a number of possible solutions 
to these issues. The harder problems are those of convincing 
a human interlocutor that a machine is a genuinely knowing 
and feeling machine. However the combination of these two 
communicative aspects to provide a fuller repertoire of the 
human communicative experience is likely to create more 
realistic scenarios and result in conversational interactions 
that will observe the conventions of communications 
between two humans. These are less likely to involve 
aggressive conversational interactions and to create 
interactions that are more oriented towards politeness, 
prosociality, and the repair of conversations that have 
become awkward or difficult.  
Providing scenarios that have some built in utility can 
also circumvent the issue of a direct generation of 
intellectual and emotional curiosity from the agent. In the 
case of intellectual curiosity search engines can be 
repurposed to provide a bank of relevant knowledge. The 
normal way of thinking about a search engine is as a 
provider of information, you provide it with a clue about the 
information you want and it seeks more similar information. 
A reframing of the function of a search engine is as an 
artificial mind-reader; a user provides a topic area and the 
search engine attempts to read the user’s mind–given the 
search query as a starting point–and provide them with the 
most relevant information. This, of course, would require 
some degree of interpretation to make any relevant 
information into a conversational utterance but there are 
many current endeavours to provide these more engaging 
interfaces to search engine output, such as personal 
assistants like Apple’s Siri, Google Now and Microsoft’s 
Cortana. 
A further avenue for providing interesting information 
that might satisfy intellectual curiosity and increase 
engagement is to get users to pre-specify channels of 
interests, this is the strategy adopted by online magazines 
such as Flipboard. Following [13] this approach is most 
likely to be useful when combined with a convincing 
argument that the information provided is not only of 
interest to the interlocutor but also to the social group that 
they are likely to be curious about, and in which they seek to 
gain social status. Presentations that take these factors into 
account are more likely to increase engagement. 
A third important source of intellectual curiosity that 
already combines these factors is social media. Users of 
Facebook, Twitter and similar platforms have “friended” 
and “followed” a certain subset of like-minded individuals 
as they are the most likely to present them with information 
that will be interesting and in turn that their social group is 
likely to find interesting. People seek interesting 
information from similar-minded people and then display 
their selective tastes by sharing a subset of these interesting 
pieces as displays that show that they in turn know what 
their followers will be interested in. Receiving likes and 
retweets serves as a confirmation of their judgments. Using 
a list of followers who are generating interesting 
information that is relevant to a given social grouping 
presents a shortcut to gathering interesting material. If an 
embodied conversational agent is to use these social media 
platforms as a basis for content generation then they may 
find a ready-made source of engaging material. 
Social media also offers the best opportunity to satisfy 
emotional curiosity. Many shared posts and tweets include 
videos and images that contain no instrumental-style 
information but contain items that have strongly affective 
content, things that are likely to move us in an artistic or 
narrative way, make us laugh, or contain an emotional 
reaction in others to some event. These kinds of posts allow 
us to gather and selectively display our tastes in affective, 
emotional, and artistic content to our social group. In a 
similar way to the use of engaging information outlined in 
the previous paragraph the use of emotional content derived 
from social media may present opportunities for a embodied 
conversational agent to present itself as having greater 
empathy and understanding without having to actually be 
empathetic and understand. 
For an embodied conversational agent these sources 
provide possible routes to the appearing to be a provider of 
engaging content that is useful from a social perspective. 
Using these “tricks” an embodied conversational agent can 
present the kind of information that one is likely to gain 
through a useful and engaging social interaction with a 
friend. These tricks can function in much the same way as 
the SEMAINE listener utterances to provide engaging, 
relevant and socially useful material and topics for 
conversation. They do not make it more likely that an 
embodied conversational agent will be viewed as an actual 
existing entity, but combined with the correct affective and 
verbal interactional skills they may maximize the likelihood 
of prolonged engagement. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The four animals of Turing’s menagerie offer insights 
into four important issues that must be addressed in order to 
create engaging interactions with embodied conversational 
agents. Wittgenstein’s talking lions highlight the necessity 
for common ground between interlocutors in order to create 
engaging conversations. Virtual bats emphasize the need for 
at least some interlocutors to possess the belief that there is 
an experiencing being that is being talked to, that the 
conversational partner is an existing entity that can convey 
something of what it is like to be an entity as part of a 
conversation. The electric sheep remind us of the 
importance of getting both the affective and linguistic 
components correct in order to generate a full interaction in 
the style of human conversation. Finally, analogical 
peacocks highlight the need to satisfy both intellectual and 
emotional curiosity to create engaging conversations. They 
also create an aspiration of adding creative and humorous 
components to a conversation to make a more engaging 
conversational mind-reader as a future goal. If these 
components can be adequately addressed then our embodied 
conversational agents may appear to be autonomously 
interacting and worthwhile conversational partners capable 
of engaging in prolonged conversational interactions.  
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